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Milton: Antitrust: Per Se Illegality for Territorial Restraints

CASE COMMENTS
ANTITRUST: PER SE ILLEGALITY FOR TERRITORIAL
RESTRAINTS*
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)
The defendant, a cooperative purchasing association of independent
grocery chains,' imposed territorial limits on member sales and customer restrictions on the wholesaling of goods procured under its auspices. 2 The Government attacked both restraints as per se violations 3 of the Sherman Act,
section 1.4 The district court refused to enjoin the practices because the restraints on intra-brand competition s were deemed reasonable in light of their
potential for augmenting inter-brand competition. 6 On appeal pursuant to
the Expediting Act,7 the Supreme Court reversed and HELD, such horizontally imposed allocations of exclusive territories as well as the customer
restrictions on member wholesaling were per se violations of the Sherman
Act.8
Unaltered from its 1890 form, section 1 of the Sherman Act declares
"every [agreement] . . .in restraint of trade ... is ... illegal." 9 Recognizing

from the earliest cases arising under the statute that a literal interpretation
of this language would cause a more pervasive effect than Congress had en*•EDrroR's NoTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the spring 1972 quarter.
1. The association was formed in 1944 to develop a private-label line of grocery products,
the initial costs of which were prohibitive for individual members. The higher profit
margins on these products and the economic benefits inherent in cooperative purchasing
of other name-brand merchandise were the primary benefits of membership. Wholly-owned
by its members but performing no market development functions, the association endeavored to protect the advertising investments and profit margins of member-chains by
imposing restraints. Brief for Appellee at 3-10, United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405
U.S. 596 (1972).
2. The territorial limitations applied only to the sale of Topco-controlled brands, 405
U.S. at 602.
3. Brief for Appellant at 15.
4. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970).
5. "Intra-brand" denotes competition in the consumer market between retailers of
identical products bearing the same trademark. "Inter-brand" signifies that competition
between retailers of identical or functionally similar products bearing different trademarks. Since product-differentiation advertising schemes are capable of developing definite
consumer preferences for identical products bearing separate trademarks, the purer intrabrand competition may be the only area in which price competition will play a significant
role. See Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its

Aftermath, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1419, 1422 (1968).
1970).
6. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill.
7. 15 U.S.C. §29 (1970). The Act provides for a direct appeal from the district court
to the Supreme Court in any antitrust case in which the United States is the complainant.
8. 405 U.S. at 608-12.
9. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970).
[213]
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visioned,' the Supreme Court adopted a "rule of reason" standard to govern
the Act's application. 1' Essentially this rule requires an economic evaluation
of the restraints alleged in each case to determine if their over-all purpose or
effect is to substantially lessen competition in any significant portion of the
market. 12 Application of the rule inevitably engages the courts in balancing
differing concepts of competition, the results of which are not always con3
sistent.1
To counter this inconsistency and to relieve courts of the inordinate burden of in-depth analysis in every case, the Court subsequently added to the
rule a corollary category of per se offenses." The category included those
restraints historically found to be inherently anticompetitive; such restraints
were to be treated with a presumption of illegality." Unfortunately, the
respective spheres of the rule and the corollary were ill-defined16 and inconsistencies became prevalent in the application of both.1
Despite this confusion both the rule of reason and the per se corollary
continue to be governing standards in all Sherman Act cases.' 8 Consequently,
in a trial the prosecution often moves for summary judgment on the ground
that the restraint is within the per se category and therefore presumed to be
illegal.' 9 The defendant may defeat this motion by showing either that the
10. See J. VAN

CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAws

31-33 (1970).

11. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
12. The classic statement of the rule was provided by Justice Brandeis: "[T]he legality
of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it
restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
. . . The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; [and] the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts....
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences."
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
13. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 775, 811-28 (1965). Compare United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), with Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918).
14. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Justice Black provided the
following classical explanation of the per se concept: "[T]here are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Id.
15. See,e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
16. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price-Fixing and Market
Division, (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373, 378 (1966).
17. Id. Compare White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), with United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
18. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Serta Associates,
Inc. v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 534, rehearing denied, 394 U.S. 967 (1969).
19. J. VAN CmsE, supra note 10, at 122-23. The restraints generally regarded as per se
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alleged restraint is outside the ambit of the per se category or that it is
reasonably ancillary to a dominant lawful purpose. 20 If he succeeds in
establishing either defense, summary judgment is avoided and the court will
21
proceed to trial on the merits to apply the rule of reason.
The relationship of the parties to an allegedly restrictive agreement may
also affect its legality.2 2 Traditionally, agreements between parties at the same
level of the production or distribution process (for example, two retailers)
have been classified as horizontal, 23 while those between parties at separate
levels (for example, manufacturer and distributor) have been termed vertical.24 Economically, the horizontal agreements are more directly destructive
of competition, since they involve cooperation between ostensible competitors.2 5 The vertical agreement, on the other hand, involves the transfer of
already existent monopoly power from one level of the market to another;
total monopoly power is not necessarily increased but its effect is always
rendered more pervasive. 26 Legally, the two types of classifications have been
27
separately treated as, for example, in White Motor Co. v. United States.
There, the Supreme Court refused to regard vertical market restrictions as
per se violations, but reiterated that similar restraints, if horizontally im2s
posed, would be within the per se ambit.
The issue in the instant case was the legality of horizontally imposed territorial and customer restrictions unaccompanied by price fixing.29 From the
earliest days of Sherman Act litigation, horizontal agreements allocating territories and customers have been deemed unlawful per se when used in conjunction with other illegal restraints such as price fixing.30 However, the Court
has repeatedly avoided the specific question of the separate legality of these
agreements by terming violations "aggregation[s] of trade restraints"31 or by
condemning market allocations for being auxiliaries of price-fixing agreements.3 2 The Court's additional failure to delineate the proper scope of the
violations are: price fixing, boycotts, market allocations, tying arrangements, and monopolistic conduct intended to foreclose competitors from a substantial market. Id. at 118.

20. Id. at 124. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
21. Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. Rxv. 1165, 1173 (1964).
22. E.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). See also Comment, Horizontal TerritorialRestraints and the
Per Se Rule, 28 WASH. 8: LE L. Rv. 457, 460 (1971).
23. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
25. See Warren, Economics of Closed-Territory Distribution, 2 ANTrrRusr L. & ECON.

R v. (No. 2), 111, 115 (1968).
26. Id.
27. 372 US. 253 (1963). See text accompanying notes 35-40 infra.
28. 372 U.S. at 263.
29. 405 U.S. at 609 n.9.
30. E.g., Addyston Pipe &Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
31. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 354 (1967); Tinken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
32. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 720 (1944).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1972

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1972], Art. [Vol.
9

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

XXV

ancillary restraints defense has compounded this uncertainty 3 Prior to the
instant case therefore, two questions remained: (1) whether horizontal market
allocation agreements standing alone were per se unlawful and (2) if so, to
what extent they might be redeemed by pro-competitive potential.
The instant Court resolved the first question unequivocally in the affirmative.3 4 It refused, however, to consider defendant's proffered evidence of the
pro-competitive potential for the restraints, 3 5 and asserted that the Sherman
Act gave Topco "no authority . . . to determine the respective values of

competition in various sectors of the economy." 36 In view of recent case
history the decision represents a definite expansion of the per se corollary and
a corresponding decline of the rule of reason.
The roots of this expansion are imbedded in White Motor Co. v. United
States37 where the Supreme Court reversed a district court's holding that
vertically imposed market restrictions were per se violations of the Sherman
Act. As a manufacturer of trucks, VWrhite Motor had attempted to allocate
exclusive territories to its independent distributors and to prohibit them from
selling to certain large users whom White serviced directly.3 8 Although the

Court reiterated the principle that similar restrictions, horizontally imposed,
were clearly unlawful,3 9 it refused to subject these vertical allocations to the
per se presumption.4 0 The absence of a demonstrable nexus between the
market restrictions and the previously enjoined price-fixing scheme also precluded an initial per se application,4 1 and the White Court felt that without
such nexus it knew "too little of the actual impact of both [restrictions] ...
42
to reach a conclusion" on their per se character.
The importance of this nexus between market restrictions and price
fixing was seemingly enhanced by United States v. Sealy, Inc. 43 Sealy owned

certain bedding
on an exclusive
cipal owners of
tions as well as

trademarks that were licensed to individual manufacturers
territorial basis. The manufacturer-licensees were the prinSealy stock. 4 4 The Government attacked the market allocaSealy's resale price maintenance scheme as horizontally im-

33. See McLaren, Territorialand Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Resale
Prices and Refusals To Deal, 37 ANTITRUsT L.J. 137, 142 (1967).
34. 405 U.S. at 609 n.9.
35. See Brief for Appellee at 20-24. The evidence was presented under the doctrine
of ancillary restraints, no mention of which occurs in the majority opinion. 405 U.S. at
596-611.
36. 405 U.S. at 610-11.
37. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
38. Id. at 255.
39. Id. at 263.
40. Id. at 264.
41. Id. at 260.
42. Id. at 261.
43. 388 U.S. 350 (1967). The significance of a nexus between the market restrictions
and a price-fixing scheme is also supported by the economic fact that territorial restrictions prevent buyers in one area from purchasing in another. As a result, retailers may
"fix" prices arbitrarily with little adverse effect. Warren, supra note 25, at 115.
44. 388 U.S. at 352.
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posed restraints subject to the per se presumption. 45 The district court found
the price-fixing scheme invalid under the per se corollary, but ruled the market allocations lawful under the rule of reason.46 The Government appealed
only the market restriction issue. Recognizing that Sealy was controlled by
its licensees, the Supreme Court deemed the territorial limitations horizontally
imposed and thereby subject to the per se presumption. 4 7 The Court, however,
avoided the issue of their separate legality once again by resurrecting the
lower court's finding of illegal price restrictions and denominating the pro48
scribed practice a traditional "aggregation of trade restraints."
On the other hand, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &cCo., 49 decided
the same day as Sealy, the Court squarely faced the issue of vertically imposed
market restrictions and extended the per se presumption to them.50 Defendant
was a leading manufacturer of bicycles and marketed its product through direct and consignment sales to independent distributors and retailers. 1 Territorial restrictions were imposed on both. In addition, distributors were permitted to sell only to franchised retailers. 52 The Government contended that these
vertically imposed market restraints were all per se violations of the Sherman
Act.5 3 The Supreme Court's response, however, was more limited. It held the
restrictions imposed where the defendant had "parted with dominion over
54
the goods ... would violate the ancient rule against restraints on alienation."
Though this "ancient rule" was in fact instant tradition in the field of
Sherman Act litigation, its adoption by the Court extended the per se presumption to naked, vertically imposed market allocations where title to the
product had been relinquished. 55
The instant Court's application of the per se corollary to Topco's restrictions was an enlargement -of the per se illegality rule consistent with
Sealy and Schwinn. Clearly, the restraints were horizontal, for the memberchains controlled Topco through an organization almost identical to that in
Sealy.5 1 The instant case differed principally from Sealy by its lack of any
price-fixing element;5 7 however, the vertical restraints in Schwinn were held
per se invalid without any finding of such coordinate restraint.58 Careful
reading of the two decisions therefore suggests that the tie to price fixing
45. Id. at 351.
46. Id. at 351-52.

47. Id. at 356-57.
48. Id. at 357. By relying on the presence of price fixing, the Court bolstered the
theory that territorial restrictions alone were legal. See also text accompanying note 32 supra.

49. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
existed.

Id.

Id. at 370.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 382.
Brief for Appellee at 11.
See text accompanying note 46 supra.
The United States did not appeal the district court's finding that no price fixing
388 US. at 368.
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in Sealy was resurrected for the sake of additional support for the holding
rather than as the basis for the per se result. To read Sealy otherwise would
be to find the Court treating the economically less destructive vertical restraints more stringently than their less desirable horizontal counterparts. 59
The instant Court reached the more logical result.
A significant aspect of the instant decision was the Court's disregard of
Topco's rebuttal evidence that its restraints were reasonably ancillary to a
lawful purpose.6 0 Topco showed that its purpose, the marketing of a privatelabel line of products, contained proved potential for lower consumer prices
and increased inter-brand competition.61 It then maintained that these restraints on intra-brand competition were required to enable the small member62
chains to assume the risk and expense of market development activities.
The Court, nevertheless, failed to take notice of this precedent-supported
defense63 on the ground that the Sherman Act provided no authority for in6
creasing competition in one arena at the expense of its demise in another. 4
Economically, this rationale is sound. The product-differentiation potential
of today's advertising has drastically reduced the role of price competition
in the inter-brand arena. 65 By contrast the purer intra-brand competition
offers much more potential benefit to the nation's consumers. 66 The Court
wisely refused to extend the scope of the ancillary restraints defense to a
situation where the restrictions were conceivably as costly as the potential
benefit to be derived from the lawful purpose.
The anomaly created by the instant decision is that cooperatives are prohibited from employing a competitive practice that remains available to
fully integrated firms. As Topco noted, and the Government conceded, the
restraints proscribed in the instant case would be completely valid if employed by one of the single large competitor chains.67 This inconsistency does
not necessarily discredit the instant holding;6 it does, however, reveal a
need for regulatory legislation with more uniform impact.
In addition, this inconsistency produces a marked conflict in present
antitrust policy by creating an obvious incentive for small businesses to
merge. Under the Clayton Act, section 7,69 as well as section 1 of the Sherman
Act,7 0 mergers are carefully regulated in order to preserve the viability of

59. See text accompanying notes 25, 26 supra.
60. See McLaren, note 33 supra.
61. Brief for Appellee at 6-8.
62. Id. at 22-23.
63. See McLaren, note 33 supra.
64. 405 U.S. at 609-10.
65. See Comanor, supra note 5, at 1422-27.
66. Id.
67. 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (1970).
68. Economically, the restraints had sufficient anticompetitive potential to support
proscription. See text accompanying notes 65, 66 supra. Certainly they should not have
been tolerated solely because loopholes existed elsewhere in antitrust regulations.
69. 15 U.S.C. §18 (1970).

70. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970).
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small business. 1 Yet the holding in the instant case readily reveals that
protection of small business is not a controlling element where the Sherman
Act is applied to other practices. Likewise, the instant Court's refusal to consider evidence of pro-competitive potential renders its stance on market
72
restrictions even more stringent than its approach to horizontal mergers.
The result is not only an incentive for small businesses to merge, but also
a limited loophole through which they may reach that end.
For Topco, whose large market share precludes merger, 73 the less effective
yet viable alternative of assigning areas of primary responsibility 4 still remains. Its adoption would entail designating one Topco member in each
territory to assume the responsibilities of market development for the
private-label products. Topco would in turn compensate him for these
activities by taxing all other members operating in the area. This alternative
would protect the responsible member from loss on advertising expenses; it
would not, however, protect his profit margin on Topco-brand goods from
the price competition of the other member firms. Likewise, evidence of such
intra-brand competition would be necessary to shield the system from in75
dictment as a de facto allocation of exclusive territories.
The instant decision continues in the tradition of Schwinn and perhaps
Sealy to establish uninhibited competition as the controlling principle of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.78 Despite its possible harsh effects on small
businesses, the decision seems laudable for its potential development of
three important goals. First, by extending the per se presumption to naked
horizontal market restrictions, the instant case has created predictability that
should allow business planners and consulting lawyers to function with some
degree of certainty. Second, this extension of the per se corollary should
produce a saving of judicial time and effort that will inure to the benefit of
business through a reduction of court delays and litigation expenses. Third,
and potentially most important, the Court's fidelity to the competitive tradition produces a sharper focus on the need for immediate legislative action
in the antitrust field. The conflict in present antitrust policy, which the
decision reveals, is indicative of the incomplete role that the single value of
competition plays in our modern economy.77 The complex nature of this

71.

See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); United States v.

Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
72. See Brief for Appellee at 36 n.86.
73. Brief for Appellee at 38. See also United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 382 U.S. 270
(1966); U.S. DrEr'T oF JusricE, MERGER GmiNEs (May 30, 1968).

74. For a short discussion of the nature and antitrust implications of this practice see
Note, Selected Antitrust Problems of the Franchisor: Exclusive Arrangements, Territorial
Restrictions,and Franchise Termination, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 260, 287-89 (1969).
75. Cf. Id. at 283-89.
76. 405 US. at 610.
77. See, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, THE Nxw INnusrpuAL STATE (1967).
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